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I. INTRODUCTION
Adjudication is a rhetorical activity, Allan Hutchinson tells us in
his new book, and no less sincere or serious for that.1 The same holds for
the book, of course, as in general for social practices and performances
having persuasive and justificatory ends in view.2
"What do/can/should judges do?"3 The book seeks to persuade us
toward some ludic answers to those leading questions. I applaud and
admire the substance and spirit of its arguments, rooted as they are in
rejection of both what Professor Hutchinson names "foundationalism"
and what he names "nihilism" in legal theory.4 I wonder, though, about
some of the rhetorical dress. To highlight the elements of play in
adjudication at its bests seems to me just right, but Hutchinson's
O 2000, F.I. Michelman.
* Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard University.
I See A.C. Hutchinson, It's All in the Game: A Nonfoundationalist Account of Law and
Adjudication (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2000) at ix-x, 12,152-53.
2 1 take Hutchinson to mean "rhetoric" in Perelman's sense of "the whole range of discourse
that aims at persuasion and conviction." C. Perelman, The Realm of Rhetoric, trans. William
Kluback (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982) at 5.
3 Hutchinson, supra note 1 at ix.
4 See ibid. at 23-27. Compare F.I. Michelman, "Bringing the Law to Life: A Plea for
Disenchantment" (1989) 74 Corn. L. Rev. 256.
5 See, for example, Hutchinson, supra note 1 at 21, 41, 165, 173.
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constant tacking in and out of images of Soccer and Cricket seems to me
a losing proposition, rhetorically speaking. When the dust has settled, I
see nothing gained but only something getting lost in the shuffle.
What I am afraid may be getting lost is a clear sense of what it is
that makes sporting games games, in morally significant contradistinction
to some other normatively constituted, competitive social practices.
Hutchinson anticipates resistance to the trope of adjudication as game,
by readers who will think it belittles the element of commitment that
makes adjudication a morally serious matter.6 Mine is a converse worry.
I think troping adjudication as a game risks obscuring the element of
commitment in games that makes them morally serious matters in their
own way.
II. PROPER GAMES
A. Proper Games and Agreement
There are games and then there are games. Asked to show the
children a game, I might show them "House." Hutchinson doesn't mean
that kind of game. He means the kind of game represented by Soccer or
Craps-a normatively constituted, competitive social activity. I use the
phrase "normatively constituted" rather than "rule-governed," so as not
to imply either (a) that the norms that constitute the activity as Craps or
Soccer must be mechanically applicable "rules," as opposed to
"standards" whose each and every application requires a fresh exercise
of judgement or skilled discretion; or (b) that the constitutive norms
cannot be structured into primary and secondary levels, where the
primary norms are alterable by methods, and on terms, that the
secondary ones authorize.7
Now, outdoor life in capitalism may itself be regarded as a
normatively constituted, competitive activity, but that doesn't mean that
all of capitalist economic and political encounter is a game. Or so I want
to maintain, my point being that differences, of arguably morally crucial
import, are regrettably suppressed by talking that way. People speaking
of "games" usually have in mind something less than the set of all
normatively constituted, competitive social activities. They mean a
6 See ibid. at 38, 41.
7 See ibid. at 12: differentiating between "the rules that comprise the body of the [game's]
substantive norms" and "those often implicit ... rules that stipulate how the game of 'playing with
the rules' is to be played."
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subset consisting of certain confined activities-activities "within the
lines"-in which players engage voluntarily, in pursuit of a victory
internal to the gaming engagement, for the sake of internal rewards,
meaning a type of reward that would lack value, or lack meaning, or lack
existence, outside the confined and optional world of the game: a trophy,
or prize-money, or the cash in a Poker "pot"-always, of course, along
with the satisfactions of skillful, resourceful exertion. Proper games, as I
shall call this subset, are what Hutchinson calls "finite" games.8
Proper games seem to me to be the normal case of the category
of games evoked by Hutchinson's text-as I expect they will seem to
most readers, Soccer and Cricket being his central examples. No doubt
there are variations around the normal case. If you forced me at
gunpoint into a hand of Poker (I've won the ranch and made for quitting
for the night), we could still say, without breaking the language, that the
game of Poker was being played there. Closer to the point, professionals
play their sports for a living, in quest of external rewards of public fame
and fortune. But the availability to them of those external rewards
depends on a public perception of them, while on the field, as
wholeheartedly engaged in the internal pursuits of victory and prize.
(Staged simulacra of Soccer games by script-bound actor-athletes
wouldn't draw big crowds or purses for very long, assuming people knew
that was what they were.) So the fact remains that what normally
distinguishes the class of games from other normatively constituted,
competitive activities, such as interest-group politics and the pursuit of
economic survival and well-being in a capitalist society, is their
optionality and the correspondingly specialized, and limited, character of
the rewards they create and make possible.
B. Justice and the Impossibility of "Infinite" Proper Games
An activity, I want to say, is not a proper game unless it is
consensually engaged in, by all who stand to be affected by the game's
distributions of whatever (internal) rewards the play of that game is
8 See ibid. at 33-34: following James Carse's definitions of finite games as those that "involve
temporal, spatial, and numerical boundaries and in which the aim of the players is to bring the game
to what amounts to a successful rule-defined conclusion," and of infinite games as those in which
"the very rules and boundaries themselves are always in play" and "the aim is not to bring the game
to an end but to keep everyone in play."
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primarily meant to control.9 By that criterion, the normatively regulated,
competitive activities we call "Capitalism," "Democracy," and
"Adjudication" are excluded, because (insofar as we do regard them as
competitive activities) they are meant to control general social
distributions of wealth and power by which everyone is affected, like it or
not.
The exclusion is not pedantry. It is prompted by a reflection on
the topic of justice. I believe I merely follow Hutchinson when I suggest
that there is a crucial split in our thought about justice, between ideas of
justice in proper games and ideas of justice in non-consensual,
normatively constituted competitive activities such as adjudication.l0 In
jargon-mine, not his-justice in proper games is always incontestably
"pure procedural justice" and justice elsewhere arguably never is.
According to a definition offered by John Rawls,
pure procedural justice obtains when there is no independent criterion for the right
result; instead there is a correct or fair procedure such that the outcome is likewise
correct or fair, whatever it is, provided the procedure has been properly followed .... If a
number of persons engage in a series of fair bets, the distribution of cash after the last bet
is fair, or at least not unfair, whatever this distribution is.1 1
Another term for pure procedural justice is playing by the rules.
Now, if you ask how playing by the rules comes to be the sole measure of
correctness-or call it of justice-in the determinations of the
distributions of the internal rewards of proper games, the obvious,
inescapable answer is that the players have cIhosen to play that game, the
one constituted by those very rules, presumably because they wish to
submit their skill, mettle, and luck to the particular sort of test that is
constituted by the rules and internal rewards of the game they join. And
the converse seems equally, inescapably true. A distribution of the
internal rewards of a proper game by any device other than sincere
application of the rules is patently unjust.
9 You could say that fans are among those who stand to be affected by internal-rewards
distributions, but then, I think, you would be bound to say too that fans are consensual participants.
"Primarily meant" allows for unavoidable spill-overs. The events they mount in the National
Basketball Association are games, despite the external distributive effects flowing from the market
power of the players. See R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974) at
160-62.
10 I have in mind Hutchinson's insistence-which makes him part company from David
Fraser, see Hutchinson, supra note 1 at 33-that Adjudication, unlike Soccer and Cricket, is an
"infinite" game. See infra notes 17-21 and accompanying text, supra note 8.
11 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1999) at 75 [emphasis added].
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Now I want to mention two things that do not follow from what I
have just been saying, and one thing that does. The first thing that does
not follow is that any game is as good as any other, provided only that
play is faithfully regulated by the rules. Some games surely may be better
than others-more absorbing or satisfying to play or witness, esthetically
or educationally superior, healthier or better adapted to the
development of worthy physical and mental muscles-and it is, of
course, the rules that make the difference. But that difference is not a
matter of justice; it falls, as John Rawls might say, under "the good" and
not "the right." 12 Which leads to the second thing that does not follow
from the ineluctable link between rule-following and justice in proper
games, namely, that the rules must be unalterable during a given round
of play. Allan Hutchinson believes-it seems to me with good
reason-that the best athletic games may well be ones in which the
primary rules are indeed alterable (or, let us say, developable through
interpretation), by officials deciding on the fly when and when not to
blow the whistle. Americans might offer, as an example, the secular
peregrinations of the strike zone, as a kind of a longitudinal vector sum
of the idiosyncratic interpretive leanings of sundry men in blue, or the
similar variations in what counts as pass interference in what we are
pleased to call Football.
And that leads in turn to the one thing that I want to insist does
follow from that ineluctable link between rule-following and justice in
proper games, which is that a proper game cannot be what Hutchinson
calls an "infinite" game. A proper game, I've just observed, can have
secondary norms that authorize on-the-fly strong interpretation of
primary rules, leading to their secular alteration. If you like, it can have
tertiary norms that authorize the alteration of the secondary ones; and
so on, but not ad infinitum, or "all the way down." The structure has to
be anchored, finally, in a normative conception of, let us say, "Baseball"
sufficiently distinct and public to be a situs of agreement on the part of
every player to play Baseball. By an "infinite game," Hutchinson means
a game of which this is not so,13 and that is exactly what a proper game
can never be.
I have already cited the reasons. (As I've mentioned, I don't
think I am doing more here than fleshing out some remarks of
Hutchinson's own.) A proper game is a competitive activity, controlling
the distribution of its internal rewards. To construct a good one, you
12 Ibid. at 22: "The problem of distribution falls under the concept of the right as one
intuitively understands it."
13 See Hutchinson, supra note 1.
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need rules fashioned with an eye to virtues of the kind I've cited
above-absorbing or aesthetically pleasing to players and witnesses,
conducive to beneficial physical and intellectual development, and so on.
Rules having virtues of that kind almost certainly will lack intrinsic
characteristics of symmetry or raw equity sufficiently robust and salient
to warrant-by themselves, so to speak, and quite aside from
consent-the justice of allowing them to control the distributions of the
game's internal rewards. (Coin-flipping is not a very good game.) What
warrants that justice, then, and all that warrants it, is the agreement of
the players to play the game, and that means a game, some game, some
distinctively cognizable game and not just "game" in general. No one
agrees to become a contestant in generic "game," or could have any
reason for doing so.
Thus, the possibility of justice in proper games depends,
absolutely, on there being for each game a "way that [the game is] meant
to be played"14 or a "spirit of the law" of that game.JS There must be, in
other words, for each proper game, a distinct and graspable normative
concept under a proper name: Baseball, Soccer, Craps, Chess,
whatever.16 The concept may be lodged on the secondary or tertiary or
---iary level of the normative structure, as long as the level on which it's
lodged is foundational, not subordinate to any further level.
III. ADJUDICATION AS AN INFINITE GAME
What is of the greatest interest, and what Hutchinson's
treatment helps us see, is that the conditions that make "infinite game"
an impossible concept for proper games do not hold for adjudication.
When the competitive activity can't exist without the competitors'
agreement to compete, because nothing17 is controlled by the play but a
distribution of rewards internal to that activity, then there is no resisting
the identification of justice with playing by the rules-from which, as
we've seen, it easily follows that the competitive activity cannot be
14 Ibi. at 6.
15 Ibid. at 29.
16 Here is an example of what I mean by a distinct and graspable concept: If the strike zone
rises, or sinks, or shifts to the inside or the outside, to a point at which a pitcher of currently
ordinary talent can dependably throw balls that are unhittable in fair territory by batters of currently
superior talent we won't be playing Baseball any more. I don't know that from any rule book, but I
do know it as a (mainly passive) participant in Baseball.
17 For innocuous qualification, see Nozicksupra note 9, and accompanying text.
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conceived as an infinite game. But what about competitive activities that
can and do exist without the competitors' agreement, it simply being the
case, as the world turns, that these activities do control distributions of
general, external rewards such as wealth and power? Adjudication, for
example.
For such activities, playing by the rules cannot possibly be all
there is to justice. By definition, such activities arise within some general
regime of coercive social ordering, and the question necessarily remains
of the justice of the coercive regime. (Where would be the justice in
forcing me to submit a civil dispute between me and Allan Hutchinson
to decision by a series of penalty kicks, he and I switching off between
the roles of kicker and goal-keeper, to be kept up until one of us is two
points ahead?) Absent the consent of all affected parties, the criterion of
justice simply must be one that, as Rawls says, is "defined separately
from and prior to the procedure which is to be followed." From which it
follows that any justice in the procedure must be of the type that Rawls
calls "perfect" or "imperfect" procedural justice, meaning our sincere
belief that the procedure is guaranteed ("perfect") or is as likely as any
procedure we can devise ("imperfect") to issue in the just result as
independently defined.S8
For bizarre example, our procedure-independent, substantive
conception of justice might be one that tells us that Allan is always more
deserving than Frank, regardless of what is at stake between them. But
what if both the two parties before us claim to be Allan and no one
present knows what Allan or Frank looks like. Given what is publicly
known about our respective biographies, it might occur to someone that
a round of the Soccer-tie-break game is pretty much guaranteed to pick
out Allan as the victor. That would be close-to-perfect procedural
justice.
But let us be serious. Our substantive conception of justice more
likely tells us that an adjudicative outcome is just if it, or the practice in
which it arises, measures up to some standard of equal respect or
concern for every person, or reflects or conforms to Kantian laws of
freedom, or maximizes social utility. There is nothing in any of those
notions, nor could there be anything in any more eclectic or "pragmatic"
notion of the justice we seek through adjudication, to preclude the
possibility that we could approach it best by cuing judges to act as if they
were players in an infinite game played with the counters of enacted
18 See RawIs, supra note 11 at 74.
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laws, precedents, argument-bytes, and so on.1 9 In other words-because
I think this is what the notion of Adjudication-as-infinite-game comes
down to20-there's nothing to preclude the possibility that we might best
approach our procedure-independent, substantive notion of justice by
cuing our judges to approach their work playfully, creatively, as poets
ever-prepared to giving strong readings to the works of fellow poets. 21 So
there is nothing to preclude the possible conclusion that we ought,
therefore, to do just that.
The core of Hutchinson's book is its extended argument that the
possibilities I've just mentioned are nothing less than the truth of the
matter.22 To that effort, I am entirely sympathetic, and in it I find the
book's great value and contribution to our thought about legal justice.
But it boots that project nothing, as far as I can see, to call Adjudication
a "special game of its own kind," to wit, an infinite game.2 3 That is
tantamount to saying it is not a game at all, according to the sense that
will be deeply engrained in the mind of almost every reader. The
consequence, rhetorically speaking, is not a gain in force for
Hutchinson's contention that judges, in the interest of a justice beyond
procedure, ought to be cued to approach adjudication in a spirit of play.
It is only suppression of a relevant, perhaps important moral question,
about the variant meanings of justice in voluntary and non-voluntary,
normatively constituted, competitive social activities.
19 Here, it is important to understand that, for Hutchinson, "the important comparison is not
between umpires and judges but between players and judges." Hutchinson, supra note 1 at 28.
Hutchinson does not want us to be thinking of games of Politics and Markets in which we are the
players, the law is the rules, and judges are the officials. He wants us thinking of judges playing their
own game, see ibid at 5, 19, doubling as officials presiding over the play as the players in a pick-up
game of Soccer have to do, see, for example, ibid. at 52, and working as they do so on the game's
constitutive norms and even its constitutive concept (see supra note 16 and accompanying text ), "all
the way down" as the saying goes, see, for example, ibid. at 21.
20 As, apparently, does Hutchinson. See ibid. at 41: apparently equating "the practice of
'politics as play' with "the view of law and life as an infinite game."
21 See R. Rorty, Contingency, irony, and solidarity (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University
Press, 1989) at 53: "In my view, an ideal liberal polity would be one whose culture hero is Bloom's
'strong poet' rather than the warrior, the priest, the sage, or the truth-seeking 'logical,' 'objective'
scientist."
22 See, for example, ibid at 41.
23 See, for example, Hutchinson, supra note 1 at 21: calling adjudication "a special game of its
own kind in that ... it is ... as much about deciding what game is to be played as it is about playing
that game") and at 33 (urging against a "disabling" view of law and life as tantamount to "cricket (or
any other game)."
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